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“WHAT I’VE LEARNED ABOUT JUDGING” 
Frank Sullivan, Jr.∗ 
It is a great honor to have been asked to deliver this lecture, 
particularly in light of the distinguished individuals who have preceded 
me in this series.  I am also every bit as honored that all of you have 
taken your time to be here. 
My association with this law school began almost twenty years ago.  
I have been extended friendship and multiple courtesies from deans, 
professors, administrators, and students.  I have been honored to serve 
on Dean Jay Conison’s National Council.  Jay, as you prepare to leave us 
for a new venture, we salute you and thank you for everything you have 
done for this great school.  I have learned a great deal by attending many 
lectures here including perhaps the greatest lecture I have ever heard 
anywhere, Professor Ronald Dworkin’s “Must Judges Be Philosophers?” 
on November 29, 1999.1 
Ed Gaffney and Richard and Rosemarie Stith have provided Cheryl 
and me with memorable experiences during sessions of the Cambridge 
summer program.  Faculty members generously critiqued my LLM 
thesis at a colloquium here.  This school provided two of my law clerks, 
Susan Oliver Martello and Melina Villalobos—and JoEllen Lind steered 
me to a third, her wonderful daughter, Erin Shencopp.  I have been 
inspired beyond measure by the brilliance, the courage, the grace, and 
the goodness of Rosalie Levinson.  For all of this and much more, my 
profound thanks. 
I want to acknowledge some special friends of mine in the 
audience—judges with whom I have worked closely and from whom I 
have learned much and the aforementioned Erin Shencopp.  And I could 
not be more pleased and flattered at the presence of a very special friend 
of mine from here in Porter County, Patricia Bengert, whose late 
husband, Daniel Bengert, was my high school debate coach, English 
teacher (read:  Shakespeare), wise mentor, and cherished friend.  Thanks 
to each of you for coming. 
As you have heard, Governor Evan Bayh did me the high honor of 
appointing me to the Indiana Supreme Court effective November 1, 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Practice, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Justice, 
Indiana Supreme Court (1993–2012). LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law (2001); 
J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law (1982); A.B., Dartmouth College (1972).  
These remarks were delivered on February 28, 2013, as the annual Supreme Court Lecture 
at the Valparaiso University Law School.  The author expresses his appreciation to the 
faculty, staff, and students for their splendid hospitality. 
1 Valparaiso University Notes, NORTHWEST IND. TIMES (Nov. 24, 1999, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nwitimes.com/uncategorized/valparaiso-university-notes/article_7f2e674e-
d13d-5da4-be6d-3da181785ce6.html. 
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1993.  I had had no prior judicial experience.  I take from the fact that you 
have invited me here tonight, that after nineteen years you are—at last—
willing to overlook that deficiency in my qualifications.  Still, since I had 
no experience with judging when I started on the court, it is fair to ask 
today what I’ve learned about judging. 
LESSON #1:  JUDGING IS MORE THAN ADJUDICATION; IT IS ALSO 
ADMINISTRATION 
For twenty-five years until his retirement approximately one year 
ago, one man stood at the helm of the Indiana judicial system—Chief 
Justice Randall T. Shepard.2  Chief Justice Shepard was a great 
adjudicator, to be sure, but he knew that the quality of the judicial 
decision meant little if justice was not actually delivered.  He taught us 
all that the proper and effective administration of the courts goes hand-
in-hand with the fair and impartial resolution of cases.  In doing so, he 
initiated and supported countless initiatives in support of a vision of 
Indiana where:  (1) the judges are highly qualified and well-trained, 
come from diverse backgrounds, and enjoy superior reputations for 
fairness, integrity, and efficiency;3 (2) the courts are properly funded, 
equipped, secured, and staffed, have relatively balanced workloads, and 
operate under rules of procedure that reflect best practices;4 (3) courts 
with specialized jurisdiction—juvenile courts and “problem-solving” 
courts—achieve great success in addressing the needs of troubled 
children and children in trouble, and of individuals dealing with issues 
such as drug abuse, mental illness, and re-entry from incarceration;5 (4) 
                                                 
2 Justice Randall Terry Shepard, COURTS.IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/citc/ 
2828.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
3 See Kevin Brown, Tribute to Randall Shepard, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 
2013) (unpublished manuscript at 4) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) 
(stating that Chief Justice Shepard was the driving force behind the Indiana Conference for 
Legal Education Opportunity (“ICLEO”) Program); Andrew R. Klein, Justice Shepard and 
Diversity in the Legal Profession:  The Legacy of ICLEO, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 
2013) (unpublished manuscript at 5) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) 
(explaining Justice Shepard’s efforts to start ICLEO despite the national program losing 
most of its funding); María Pabón López, The ICLEO Mentoring Legacy of Chief Justice Randall 
Shepard:  An Essay; 48 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2013) (unpublished manuscript 
at 4) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review) (stating that Chief Justice 
Shepard played an instrumental role in the creation of ICLEO).  ICLEO’s goals are to assist 
minority, low-income, or educationally disadvantaged college graduates in attending law 
school and entering the legal profession.  López, supra. 
4 See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Chief Justice, Indiana Supreme Court, Burdened but 
Unbowed (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/2453.htm (addressing 
Indiana’s efforts to establish a respectable court system). 
5 See Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court Reform, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1535, 1549–51 (2006) (calling for a reform movement that looks to what 
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the courts are equipped with twenty-first century technology that 
maximizes court efficiency and provides court information to those who 
need it;6 and (5) litigants have effective access to the courts without 
regard to financial circumstances.7 
Partnered with the Indiana Supreme Court in these endeavors are 
the hundreds of men and women who serve as judicial officers 
throughout our state.  They recognize the importance of both 
adjudicative work and administrative work, and they are totally 
committed to seeing a vision similar to the one I have just articulated 
become a reality—and not just for their courts or for their counties but 
for our entire state.  They make our justice system work, and they 
deserve our admiration and appreciation. 
LESSON #2:  JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS MATTER 
During my time on the Indiana Supreme Court, I saw two 
candidates for the Illinois Supreme Court spend more than $9.3 million 
seeking to be elected in 2004.8  One was strongly supported by plaintiff 
personal injury lawyers, the other by business and insurance interests.9  
All the while, the appeal from a multi-million-dollar jury verdict against 
State Farm Insurance was pending before the court.10   
During my time on the court, the New York Times wrote a major story 
about how candidates for the Ohio Supreme Court had raised more than 
$21.2 million over the prior decade seeking to be elected, while routinely 
sitting on cases involving parties or groups filing amicus briefs from 
                                                                                                             
other state supreme courts have done to create special problem-solving courts); Kathryn 
Dolan, Indiana Juvenile Court to Be Featured in Nationally Broadcast Documentary, 
COURTS.IN.GOV (July 31, 2008), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/press/2008/0731.html 
(reporting Chief Justice Shepard’s desire to continually evaluate the juvenile court system 
to see how it can help children and families in trouble). 
6 See About:  Mission Statement, COURTS.IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jtac/ 
2373.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (explaining that in 1999 the Indiana Supreme Court 
created its Judicial Technology and Automation Committee). 
7 See Shepard, supra note 5, at 1543–46 (describing the need to assure equal access to 
justice). 
8 Whitney Woodward, 2010 Justice Kilbride Retention in Illinois, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 843, 855 
(2012). 
9 See Edward J. Kionka, Things to Do (or Not) to Address the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469, 475 (2006) (“[I]n the 2004 election, tort reform, business, 
insurance, medical, and legal groups on the right side of the political spectrum contributed 
about four-and-one-half million dollars to Judge Karmeier’s campaign.  Interests on the 
other side of the spectrum contributed a like amount to Justice Maag’s campaign.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
10 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 810 (Ill. 2005). 
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which they had received campaign contributions.11  During my time on 
the court, contribution-fueled television advertising in a campaign for a 
seat on the Michigan Supreme Court described one candidate as soft on 
terrorists and sexual predators and the other as a pawn for big business 
who literally slept on the job.12 
Unlike our neighbors to the west, east, and north, the justices of the 
Indiana Supreme Court do not rely on campaign contributions and 
television advertising to obtain their seats.  We have instead a merit 
selection system, in place since 1970, in which the governor appoints the 
members of the court from a list of nominees compiled by a judicial 
nominating commission consisting of lawyers and non-lawyers alike.13  
Once appointed, justices stand for periodic yes/no retention votes.14   
This method of judicial selection and accountability helps assure that 
people of integrity, impartiality, and intelligence are appointed.  The 
involvement of the governor and non-lawyer commission members, 
along with periodic retention votes, helps assure accountability.  The 
absence of contested elections means that there is no perception either 
that justice in Indiana is for sale or that lawsuits are decided in response 
to party or interest-group contributions.  We are fortunate to have such a 
system for the reasons I have indicated, and I hope that you will all join 
me in committing ourselves to preserving it. 
LESSON #3:  JUDGING BENEFITS FROM EXPERIENCE 
Many judges and legal theorists, as well as law school orientation 
and commencement speakers, have expropriated Holmes’s aphorism—
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience”15—so I 
feel no compunction in doing so either.   
                                                 
11 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01 
judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see James Nash, Ohio’s High-Court Races Are Flush with 
Cash, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 16, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/ 
stories/local/2010/08/16/ohios-high-court-races-are-flush-with-cash.html (recognizing 
that Ohio Supreme Court candidates spent $21.2 million from 2000 to 2009); see also JAMES 
SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009:  DECADE OF CHANGE 
78–85 (2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecade 
ONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf (detailing the amount spent on state judicial elections in 
each state between 2000 and 2009). 
12 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 30, 35. 
13 IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9–10; see Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana, AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IN (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2013) (identifying that appellate courts undergo a similar selection process). 
14 IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11. 
15 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 
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Now I unselfconsciously said at the outset that I had no prior judicial 
experience at the time of my appointment to the court, but that is not to 
say that I had no experience with the real-life issues that were to come 
before the court.  When asked in settings like this for an example of a 
case in which my real-life experience informed my judging, I often tell 
the story of Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin.16 
In 1992, while I was recovering from a serious automobile accident, 
my doctor wrote me a refillable prescription for Vicodin.  When I tried to 
refill the prescription, the pharmacist told me that she could not do so 
until she contacted my physician since I had consumed the pain-killer at 
a rate faster than that prescribed.  Later, my doctor would tell me that he 
was furious that the pharmacist had not simply refilled the prescription 
as his written instructions had directed and that she had no business 
questioning his written order. 
In the Hooks SuperX, Inc. case, McLaughlin also consumed pain-
killing drugs at a rate much faster than prescribed.17  However, 
McLaughlin’s pharmacist followed the physician’s written instructions 
without question.18  A subsequent lawsuit contended the pharmacy had 
breached its legal duty of care by allowing McLaughlin to consume 
drugs at a rate that posed a threat to his health.19 
Now, our court did not need my auto accident experience to 
conclude—as it did—that pharmacists are professionals who have a legal 
responsibility to exercise judgment in their work; that they are not—as 
my own physician seemed to think—robots or automatons whose job it 
is to follow the orders of MDs without question.  However, I do think 
my experience helped us identify some nuances of the physician-
pharmacist-patient relationship that made for a better opinion and for 
better law. 
No judge will have relevant experience on every case that comes 
before his or her court.  However, as I hope my Hooks SuperX, Inc. 
example demonstrates, the more relevant real-life experience that can be 
brought to bear in judging, the better the judging.   
One way to bring more relevant real-life experience to bear in 
judging is by enhancing diversity among those involved in the decision-
making process.  Men and women from different backgrounds and 
experiences than our own often produce new perspectives on issues—
and entirely new ways of looking at, examining, and solving problems.  
                                                 
16 642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994). 
17 Id. at 516. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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This is why diversity among judges on multi-member appellate courts is 
so desirable. 
Hardly anything about the last nineteen years of my life approaches 
the satisfaction of the keen friendships that I have developed with the 
twenty-eight lawyers who served as my law clerks.  A major part of the 
reason I say that is because of how much they taught me—to be sure, 
some of it merely generational:  as each year went by, the clerks were 
that much younger than me!—as women, African-Americans, Hispanics, 
and Asian-Americans, they brought background and experience to the 
issues confronting our court that I simply did not have. 
There is one last point about the relationship of experience to 
judging that I want to make.  Just because a judge on a multi-member 
court has prior personal experience related to a matter before the court—
like my experience with consuming medicine faster than prescribed—
does not privilege that judge’s view on the merits as to the outcome of 
the case.  Chief Justice Shepard had a lot of experience in local 
government administration and that experience was helpful to all of us 
in understanding zoning disputes.20  But, that did not mean that we 
deferred to his view as to the outcome.  Chief Justice Dickson worked as 
an insurance adjuster while in law school and that experience was 
helpful to us in understanding insurance disputes.21  Yet, that did not 
mean that we deferred to his view as to the outcome.  Nor did the 
background and experience of my clerks dictate how I would vote. 
But the life of the law has been experience, and the more experience 
that can be brought to bear on legal questions, the better the answers will 
be. 
LESSON #4:  JUDGING IS OFTEN A DANCE WITH THE LEGISLATURE 
If I channeled Holmes in discussing judging as experience, here I 
draw from a contemporary jurist in discussing judging as a dance with 
the legislature:  Wisconsin’s Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson.  In 
1991, Chief Justice Abrahamson authored an article entitled Shall We 
                                                 
20 See Photo Release—Old National Appoints Former Chief Justice Randall Shepard to Corporate 
Board of Directors, OLD NAT’L BANCORP (July 9, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://globenewswire. 
com/news-release/2012/07/09/272979/261538/en/Photo-Release-Old-National-Appoints 
-Former-Chief-Justice-Randall-Shepard-to-Corporate-Board-of-Directors.html (stating that 
Chief Justice Shepard served in local government before serving on the Indiana Supreme 
Court). 
21 Dan Carden, Gary Native Takes Helm as Indiana’s Acting Chief Justice, NWI POLITICS 
(Mar. 25, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/gary-
native-takes-helm-as-indiana-s-acting-chief-justice/article_a5f33d63-3647-5dad-98e4-21453f 
2fd8e5.html. 
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Dance?  Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation.22  It 
described how court decisions can provoke a legislative response 
followed by additional court decisions—a sort of “dance” or 
“dialogue.”23 
During my tenure on the court, the statehouse was a veritable 
discothèque.  One of the most famous dances actually started in this 
building.  In the fall of 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court held oral 
argument at this law school in Barnes v. State, a criminal case in which 
the defendant had been convicted of battery on a police officer.24  He 
appealed, contending that his conviction conflicted with his common law 
right forcibly to defend his home against invasion.25  When our court 
rejected his defense, the legislature passed a statute expressly 
authorizing an individual forcibly to resist police officers in the 
individual’s home in specified circumstances.26 
Another example of Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dance is Estate of 
Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, where the estate of an Allen County Sheriff’s 
Deputy—who had been killed by a fugitive felon—sued the parents of 
the killer.27  The parents had assisted their son in avoiding arrest by 
hiding him in their lake cottage;28 the murder weapon was a gun 
belonging to the parents that the son took from the cottage.29  The estate 
sought damages from the parents on the theory that they had failed to 
exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the storage and safekeeping of 
their firearm.30  We allowed the estate’s claim to proceed, and the 
legislature thereupon passed a law providing immunity from civil 
liability for any act or omission related to the use of a firearm by another 
person if the other person obtained the firearm illegally.31  Had this law 
been in effect at the time the deputy was killed, the parents would have 
been immune from suit because their son had stolen the firearm from 
their cottage. 
Those of you who had occasion to watch or read Chief Justice 
Dickson’s excellent 2013 State of the Judiciary speech to the legislature last 
                                                 
22 Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and 
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991) (expanding on the William B. 
Lockhart Lecture that Justice Abrahamson delivered at the University of Minnesota in 
March 1990). 
23 Id. at 1045, 1055. 
24 946 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
25 Id. at 575. 
26 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(i) (West Supp. 2013) (as amended by P.L. 189-2006, § 1). 
27 786 N.E.2d 265, 266 (Ind. 2003). 
28 Id. at 267. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-20-1 (West 2011) (as added by P.L. 80-2004, § 5). 
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month saw that he spent some time on this very subject of the dance or 
dialogue between the courts and the legislature.32  “[O]ur two branches 
each respect the other’s essential function,” he said. “You determine 
public policy and make the laws, and we follow and apply them—
whether we agree or not.  And if you disagree with the way we interpret 
a statute, you amend it as you wish.”33  Now I want to associate myself 
with Chief Justice Dickson’s central point—that it is the legislature and 
not the courts that, in his words, “determine public policy and make the 
laws.”34  I will speak more to this in a few minutes.  To emphasize my 
agreement, I need to tell you about two more types of cases. 
In Ross v. State, a defendant was convicted of and sentenced for a 
misdemeanor violation of Indiana’s handgun statute.35  Then the trial 
court increased the sentence using a statute specifically designed to 
increase sentences for repeat handgun violators.36  The trial court 
increased the sentence yet again using the “habitual offender” statute 
generally designed to increase sentences for repeat offenders no matter 
what their crime.37  We held that once the sentence had been increased 
using the specific handgun statute, it could not be increased again using 
the general statute unless the legislature specifically said so.38  After our 
decision, the legislature moved in the direction of our opinion by 
removing certain offenses and categories of offenses from eligibility for 
increased sentences using the general habitual offender statute.39 
Now let me tell you about Citizens State Bank of New Castle v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., where our court catapulted a junior lien 
into a senior position after foreclosure and transfer of the property.40  I 
took the position in dissent that the junior lien was not entitled to the 
priority the court gave it.41  The legislature then passed a law overruling 
the court’s majority opinion, effectively writing my dissent into the 
Indiana Code.42 
I hope you can see that sometimes the legislature overrules the 
court’s opinions; sometimes it acts in furtherance of the court’s opinions; 
                                                 




35 729 N.E.2d 113, 114 (Ind. 2000). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 115–17. 
39 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2012) (as amended by P.L. 291-2001, § 226). 
40 949 N.E.2d 1195, 1201–02 (Ind. 2011). 
41 Id. at 1202–03 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
42 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-8-4 (West Supp. 2013) (as added by P.L. 130-2012, § 7). 
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and sometimes it effectively adopts a dissenting opinion.  It's quite a 
dance, isn't it? 
LESSON #5:  JUDGING’S PLACE IN A SEPARATION OF POWERS DEMOCRACY IS 
TENUOUS 
In our constitutional order, the legislative branch is given the power 
to make law; the executive branch is given the power to administer the 
laws.  Their decisions are effectuated through majoritarian politics.  Our 
constitutional order entrusts resolving disputes to the judicial branch 
and insulates its decisions from majoritarian politics.  We call this 
dimension of the constitutional order “separation of powers” or, in 
Indiana, “separation of functions.”43 
One of the most important lessons I have learned about judging is its 
tenuous place in a separation of powers democracy.  On the one hand, 
separation of powers gives the law-making power to the legislative 
branch, not the judicial branch; on the other hand, where the law in a 
case is not clearly established, a judge makes law in the course of 
exercising the judicial branch power to resolve disputes. 
I raise here the problem familiar to many of you—the “[c]ounter-
[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty,” to use Professor Bickel’s apt description 
coined fifty years ago.44  Doing what separation of powers entrusts the 
judiciary to do—resolve disputes—inevitably requires exercising powers 
entrusted to the majoritarian branches.  This is why we have the policy 
of judicial restraint which, as the Supreme Court has said, is not “merely 
procedural” but rather is “one of substance.”45  The policy’s ultimate 
foundations “are found in . . . the necessity . . . for each [branch of 
government] to keep within its power.”46 
This is easier said than done, of course.  How on earth do judges not 
act upon their personal political and policy preferences—that is what I 
have concluded “judicial restraint” means—when presented with a case 
where the law is not clear?  And not only when confronted with 
constitutional cases, but also cases like Heck as originally presented or 
Barnes or Ross? 
Among the ways I tried to keep my personal and policy preferences 
from impinging upon my votes on cases before our court was being alert 
to whether cases were “ripe” or plaintiffs had “standing.”  “Ripeness 
relates to the degree to which the defined issues in a case are based on 
                                                 
43 See IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (laying out Indiana’s separation of functions). 
44 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
45 Rescue Army v. Mun. Court. of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947). 
46 Id. at 571. 
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actual facts rather than on abstract possibilities, and are capable of being 
adjudicated on an adequately developed record.”47  Here is an example:  
an applicant for a permit to operate a landfill challenged the 
constitutionality of a statute that required applicants for such permits to 
disclose their criminal histories.48  Because the Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management had not begun considering the application, 
we concluded that the case was not ready or “ripe” for our review.49 
The standing requirement is grounded in this same philosophy:  
“[C]ourts act in real cases, and eschew action when called upon to 
engage only in abstract speculation.”50  We deployed the requirement of 
standing in the case of Pence v. State, in which future-Governor Mike 
Pence, then a private citizen, challenged the constitutionality of a statute 
increasing legislative pensions on grounds that it violated the Indiana 
Constitution’s requirement that statutes be limited to a single subject.51  
We held that Pence did not have standing because “[f]or a private 
individual to invoke the exercise of judicial power, such person must 
ordinarily show that some direct injury has or will immediately be 
sustained.”52 
It is tempting to think that judges can act on personal preferences in 
common law cases—contract, property, and personal liability claims—
where no statute or constitutional principle is at stake.  Indeed, common 
law is sometimes called “judge-made law.”  However, because 
separation of powers demands judicial restraint, judges cannot decide 
common-law cases based on personal preferences any more than they 
can in statutory interpretation or constitutional ones.53 
One way to avoid utilizing personal political and policy preferences 
in deciding common law cases is stare decisis—adherence to precedent.  
Justice Thurgood Marshall makes my point in a 1986 opinion—stare 
decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded 
in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby 
contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, 
both in appearance and in fact.”54 
                                                 
47 Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ind. 
1994). 
48 Id. at 335–36. 
49 Id. at 337. 
50 Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). 
51 Id. at 487. 
52 Id. at 488. 
53 See discussion supra notes 45–46 (explaining judicial restraint and the importance of 
separation of powers). 
54 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986). 
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There is a particular value to precedent in common law cases, 
specifically that reliance interests are often at stake.  Individuals and 
businesses will have ordered their affairs—and will often purchase 
insurance—based on their understanding of the existing consensus as to 
legal principles governing contract, property, and personal liability.  
“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases 
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
involved,” Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1991.55  This is also the point 
of one of Justice Brandeis’s most famous aphorisms:  “[s]tare decisis is 
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”56 
One of the most dramatic examples of adherence to stare decisis in 
common law cases during my tenure on the court manifested itself in a 
decision just a few days before my departure.  At issue was the so-called 
“pollution exclusion” in the standard business comprehensive general 
liability insurance policy, providing that the policy will not cover an 
insured’s liability for personal injury or property damage caused by 
“pollutants.”57  Early on in my tenure on the court, in American States 
Insurance Co. v. Kiger, we held that the exclusion was too ambiguous for 
the insurance company to enforce.58  Two days before I left the court, in 
State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., the court once again 
held the policy exclusion unenforceable.59  In doing so, Justice Rucker 
wrote, “Indiana decisions have been consistent in recognizing the 
requirement that language of a pollution exclusion be explicit.  ‘To 
unsettle the law . . . would show scant respect for the principle of stare 
decisis.’”60  He concluded by writing, “[w]e see no reason to abandon 
settled precedent.”61 
Precedent will not resolve every dispute.  Precedent may be 
distinguishable; precedent may be obsolete; indeed, precedent may not 
exist.  A particularly good source for legal principles to apply in such 
circumstances is the work produced by the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”).  Consisting of lawyers, judges, and law professors of distinction, 
including members of this faculty, the ALI addresses uncertainty in the 
law by developing “restatements” of legal subjects for use by courts and 
                                                 
55 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
56 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 
(1938). 
57 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 2012). 
58 662 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ind. 1996). 
59 964 N.E.2d at 852. 
60 Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2639–40 n.4 (2011)). 
61 Id.  
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lawyers applying existing law.  These “restatements of the law” contain 
clear formulations of common law, meant to reflect the law as it 
presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a court.62 
I could give you a lot of examples of our court turning to 
restatements to help us decide previously unanswered questions of 
common law.  In fact, I was always willing to consider an argument to 
overrule precedent that was grounded in a restatement.  There are, of 
course, sound reasons for not adhering to stare decisis.  For example, 
Justice Brandeis stated that not adhering to stare decisis is appropriate 
where a decision was “rendered upon an inadequate presentation of 
then existing conditions, but the conditions may have changed 
meanwhile.  Moreover, the judgment of the court in the earlier decision 
may have been influenced by prevailing views as to economic or social 
policy[,] which have since been abandoned.”63  Justice Kennedy has 
written for the Court that stare decisis need not be adhered to where a 
precedent is not workable, antiquated, or not well-reasoned.64 
However, mindful of our separation of powers constraints, the fact 
that precedent may be legitimately overruled does not give a judge 
license to adopt a personal political or policy preference instead.  This is 
why restatements are so helpful—they allow a judge to present to the 
court a legal rule of the law as it presently stands based on careful study 
by lawyers, judges, and professors. 
Here is but one example of many.  Creasy v. Rusk is an opinion of 
mine in a tort case that I understand is widely taught in law schools.65  A 
nurse sued her patient for injuries suffered when she was kicked by the 
patient, a person with Alzheimer’s disease, while she was trying to put 
him to bed in a nursing home.66  One of the issues in the case was 
whether the general duty of care imposed upon adults with mental 
disabilities is the same as that for adults without mental disabilities.67  At 
the time of the Creasy case, Indiana precedent held that a person’s mental 
                                                 
62 See STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 379 (9th ed. 2009) 
(explaining that the ALI first adopted restatements “for the law of agency, conflict of laws, 
contracts, judgments, property, restitution, security, torts, and trusts” between 1923 and 
1944). 
63 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 
(1938). 
64 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009)). 
65 730 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. 2000); see DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION:  
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 92 (6th ed. 2009). 
66 Creasy, 730 N.E.2d at 661. 
67 Id. 
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capacity was a factor in determining whether a legal duty existed.68  
However, we found that “contemporary public policy in Indiana[,] as 
embodied in enactments of our state legislature,” then “reflected policies 
to deinstitutionalize people with disabilities and integrate them into the 
least restrictive environment.”69  We found this to be more in accord with 
the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 283B and adopted it, 
articulating that “mental disability does not excuse a person from 
liability for ‘conduct which does not conform to the standard of a 
reasonable man under like circumstances.’”70  When the ALI produced 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm, the 
Reporters’ Note to section 11, comment e, singled out Creasy for 
particular mention.71 
The policy of judicial restraint applies with particular force in 
constitutional cases.  When a court declares a statute unconstitutional, 
the court tells the legislature that notwithstanding its lawmaking 
authority, this particular law goes beyond that authority.  Some would 
say that that is a good thing because there are many laws that Congress 
and the Indiana General Assembly never should have enacted and it is 
good for a court to tell them so.  But, apart from the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty that we have been discussing, declaring a statute 
unconstitutional oftentimes places highly controversial subject matter 
beyond legislative compromise.  When a court declares a statute 
unconstitutional, it is not just engaged in lawmaking, it is affirmatively 
restricting the ability of the legislative branch from engaging in its 
constitutional function of making law.  And when highly controversial 
subject matter cannot be compromised, dire consequences can flow from 
the inability of the contending legislative factions to compromise. 
I offer our court’s performance in the property tax case, State Board of 
Tax Commissioners v. Town of St. John, as an example.72  At the time 
litigation began, real property was assessed based on its “true tax 
value.”73  “True tax value” was not market value but rather was based on 
“cost schedules” that took into account replacement cost, physical 
depreciation, and obsolescence, causing the value to vary depending 
upon whether the property was industrial, commercial, agricultural, or 
                                                 
68 Id. at 662. 
69 Id. at 664–65. 
70 Id. at 663, 666 (adopting as law the Restatement’s position that “a person with mental 
disabilities is generally held to the same standard of care as that of a reasonable person 
under the same circumstances”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). 
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 reporters’ 
notes cmt. e (2010). 
72 702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998). 
73 Id. at 1037. 
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residential.74  This was alleged to violate a provision of our Indiana 
Constitution that mandates the General Assembly to provide “for a 
uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation.”75  The 
Indiana Supreme Court held the “true tax value” system to be 
unconstitutional.76  To be precise, the court declared the “cost schedules” 
used to calculate the “true tax value” unconstitutional because they did 
not meet the requisite uniformity and equality requirements.77 
As you can see, the court’s decision placed the ability to compromise 
the competing interests of industrial, commercial, agricultural, and 
residential taxpayers beyond the power of the legislature in ways that 
had occurred for many decades.  The consequences were dire, especially 
for owners of more expensive homes in older urban neighborhoods like 
Miller in Gary, Twyckenham Hills in South Bend, and Meridian Kessler 
in Indianapolis.78 
When I was on the court, my views on the reach of judicial review in 
constitutional cases comprised the position of only one justice, and you 
are very nice to give him an audience this afternoon to present his views.  
My principal attempts at articulating them came in Town of St. John,79 the 
property tax case just mentioned, and another case called Municipal City 
of South Bend v. Kimsey.80  In both cases, our court declared that the 
challenged enactments violated the Indiana Constitution.81  In both cases, 
I dissented.82   
I stated my objection to the majority’s ruling in the property tax case 
as follows: 
I can think of no area where we can be more confident of 
the ability of the normal democratic processes working 
as they should than in taxation.  Residential, 
commercial, industrial[,] and agricultural interests can 
                                                 
74 Id. at 1037 n.4, 1038–39, 1042. 
75 IND. CONST. art. X, § 1; Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1038 (describing Indiana’s 
constitution as requiring “uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation and for just 
valuation”). 
76 Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1043. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Cordell Eddings, Neighbors Are Bracing for Tax Bills:  Meridian-Kessler Residents 
Fear Another Hike in Property Taxes Will Force Some to Leave Area, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 
15, 2007), http://archive.indystar.com/article/20070625/LOCAL18/706250397/Neighbors 
-bracing-tax-bills (reporting on increases in property taxes after the Town of St. John 
decision). 
79 Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044 (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
80 781 N.E.2d 683, 697 (Ind. 2003) (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 697; Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1043. 
82 Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 697 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044 
(Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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well pursue and protect their respective interests in state 
tax policy before the executive and legislative branches 
without judicial intervention.83 
In Kimsey, the court struck down a statute that restricted the ability 
of cities in St. Joseph County to annex suburban territory because it 
violated a prohibition on “special legislation” contained in Article IV of 
the Indiana Constitution.84  My answer was that “[t]he legislation at issue 
here represents a political struggle between suburban and urban 
interests.  While the geographic focus of this particular law was St. 
Joseph County, the legislative history shows a hard-fought battle in 
which the suburban interests narrowly prevailed.”85 The court had 
“intervene[d] to turn those who lost a close fight in the [l]egislature into 
winners.”86 
Now I did not much like assessing property based on “true tax 
value” and had advocated a market value system when I was Indiana 
State Budget Director.  I certainly would have voted “no” on the law at 
issue in Kimsey had I been a legislator.  However, I hope you understand 
the thrust of my dissents.  My view in these two cases was that 
separation of powers demanded that the court not intervene to 
invalidate statutes where it was clear that the majoritarian political 
process had worked in exactly the way the constitution intended.  
Competing interest groups brought their views to the legislature and the 
legislature acted on those views, making compromises it deemed 
appropriate along the way. 
Now what is the counterargument to my position?  It is pretty 
straightforward, is it not?  When presented with a constitutional 
question, courts have the duty to answer it.  Justice Boehm forcefully 
made this point while writing for the majority in the Kimsey case:   
 Justice Sullivan in substance argues for a doctrine of 
nonjusticiability of Article IV issues.  But for over 
seventy years precedent has uniformly rejected [his] 
view. . . . As we held in Dawson v. Shaver [in 1822], citing 
Marbury v. Madison:  “The task is delicate and 
unpleasant, but the duty of the Court is imperative, and 
its authority is unquestionable, to declare any part of a 
statute null and void that expressly contravenes the 
                                                 
83 Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d at 1044 (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
84 Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 684. 
85 Id. at 698 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
86 Id.  
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provisions of the constitution, to which the legislature 
itself owes its existence.”87 
Justice Boehm was right that I argue for a doctrine of 
nonjusticiability when it comes to judicial review of legislative 
enactments where there is no suggestion that the majoritarian process 
did not work properly.  Justice Boehm maintained that the majoritarian 
process did not work properly in the Kimsey situation,88 and I contended 
that there was no way a court could reach that conclusion.89  However, 
all of this is a level of detail that I simply do not have time to get into 
today. 
What if the majoritarian process has not worked properly in a 
particular case?  Would I still treat the claim as non-justiciable?  In 
arguing against my position, Justice Boehm deployed the 
reapportionment decisions of the 1960s to attempt to demonstrate the 
necessity for judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes.90  “What, 
Sullivan, do you say about this?,” Justice Boehm’s position asks.  
“Shouldn’t the court have intervened to rectify malapportionment?  And 
if your answer to that is ‘yes,’ how do you justify not intervening in cases 
like Town of St. John and Kimsey?” 
I find my answer in the famous footnote four of Justice Stone’s 
opinion for the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.91  Carolene Products Co. is an otherwise little-known case in 
which a federal statute protecting the milk industry was challenged on 
grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause and the Fifth 
Amendment.92  The Court rather summarily dismissed the constitutional 
challenges, citing the Court’s obligation to presume that Congress had 
acted rationally.93  But the Court added a footnote—footnote four—at 
this point, saying that scrutiny of a statute for constitutionality may be 
warranted in one of three circumstances:  (1) where the statute appears 
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Bill of Rights; (2) 
where the statute “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation;” and (3) 
                                                 
87 Id. at 695–96 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Dawson v. Shaver, 1 
Blackf. 204, 206–07 (1822)). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 698 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 695 (majority opinion). 
91 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
92 Id. at 145–46. 
93 Id. at 152–54. 
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where the statute reflects prejudice against particular religious, national, 
racial, or other discrete and insular minorities.94 
Notice what happens in these three circumstances.  In the first, the 
court is in a position where it cannot avoid ruling on constitutionality.  If 
the legislature takes action that facially violates a constitutional 
provision, the court can hardly defer to the legislature as the legislature 
has no authority to make a statute in violation of the plain language of 
the constitution.   
As to the second, separation of powers demands the proper 
functioning of the majoritarian process, and so it is entirely appropriate 
for a court to assure that the legislature’s exercise of its lawmaking 
authority does not extend to undermining the majoritarian process.  As 
footnote four reads, the legislature’s lawmaking authority does not 
extend to “restrict[ing] those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”95  The proper 
functioning of the majoritarian process must not restrict the legislature’s 
ability to pass self-correcting legislation.  Note that Justice Boehm’s 
malapportionment example falls snugly into this exception to my rule of 
non-justiciability.   
As to the third—legislation prejudicing religious, national, racial, or 
other discrete and insular minorities—the point is that courts may need 
to step in to assure that the majoritarian political process respects the 
constitutional rights of minorities.  Why?  Simply because their being in 
the minority may prevent them from having sufficient political influence 
to protect their rights in a majoritarian process. 
My position is that in judicial review for constitutionality, separation 
of powers counsels, if not demands, that the legislative branch has free 
reign when it comes to political and policy preferences, including those 
regarding taxes and annexation.  The court’s power of judicial review 
should be constrained to instances where the legislature has tread upon 
the very face of the constitution; tread upon the self-correcting features 
of the majoritarian process; or tread upon the rights of those whom the 
constitution, but not the majoritarian process, protects. 
LESSON #6:  JUDGING REQUIRES COLLEGIAL COLLABORATION, EVEN IN 
DISSENT 
During my years on the court, I had the good fortune of serving with 
judges for whom collegiality was a conspicuous character trait.  Here is a 
photograph of everyone I served with except Justices Richard Givan and 
                                                 
94 Id. at 152 n.4. 
95 Id. 
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Mark Massa.  From the left are Justice Robert Rucker, a graduate of this 
law school, former-Chief Justice Shepard, who will be honored here later 
this spring, Justices Ted Boehm, Myra Selby, Roger DeBruler, and Steven 
David, and Chief Justice Dickson.96  Each was the most wonderful of 
mentors and friends, as were Justices Givan and Massa. 
Let me start with the topic of dissent, about which I want to say two 
things.  First, earlier I quoted Justice Brandeis:  “[I]t is more important 
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”97  
By the end of my judicial career, I had come to the conclusion that this 
was not always the case, but it sometimes was the case.  People needed 
to know what the rules of law were by which they should organize their 
affairs—for example, buy insurance and the like—and that what the 
actual rules were was not nearly as important as whether they were 
clearly established.  In such situations, I think dissent is of little utility 
and some detriment.  Once a rule is established and reliance interests set 
in, the likelihood of abandoning that precedent is slight and the 
advisability of doing so questionable.  What does dissent do in such a 
circumstance except to undermine the clarity of the rule? 
I decided that in cases where it was more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled correctly, and 
where no one else on the court shared my view of what the rule should 
be, I would throw my lot in with the majority and make the opinion 
unanimous.  But what about those cases where I concluded that it was 
more important that the law be settled correctly, or where I had another 
justice with me?  In such circumstances, I did dissent. 
My muse was former Justice Roger O. DeBruler.  Justice DeBruler, as 
many of you know, was the longest-serving justice on our court during 
the twentieth century—and the second longest-serving justice ever.98  He 
sat on the court during a period of time when he frequently found 
himself in dissent.  His dissents are models of decorum.  Some judges or 
justices say they “respectfully dissent.”  Justice DeBruler respectfully 
dissented.  The fact that his dissents were tightly reasoned, not 
overstated, and were written in a straightforward, declarative style—not 
punctuated with hyperbolic rhetoric—meant that when a new 
generation of justices joined the court towards the end of his tenure and 
                                                 
96 For a replication of the photograph referred to in this lecture, see Charles F. Pratt, 
Farewell to the Chief, IND. CT. TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://indianacourts.us/times/2012/05/ 
farewell-to-the-chief/. 
97 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). 
98 See Randall T. Shepard, On the Retirement of Justice Roger O. DeBruler, 30 IND. L. REV. 7, 
7 (1997) (stating that Justice DeBruler was second in years of service only to Justice 
Blackford of the nineteenth century). 
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following—justices with names like Shepard, Dickson, Sullivan, and 
Boehm—the DeBruler dissents of years gone by became the majority 
opinions of the Indiana Supreme Court.99  I know I did not achieve the 
high standard that Roger set, but whenever in dissent, I tried to emulate 
his style. 
Now the last thing I want to say about collegial collaboration, and 
the last thing I want to say in this lecture, is about our court’s record in 
what I will call “Democrat versus Republican” cases.  To be clear, these 
are cases where the two political parties are literally on the opposite 
sides of the “v.”  I spoke at the outset of these remarks about the 
felicitous judicial selection system we have in Indiana for our appellate 
judiciary.  Nevertheless, each of us is appointed by a governor of a 
particular party and, at least until this point in time, each appointment to 
the court has been a person of his or her appointing governor’s party.  
Before appointment to the court, I was several times a campaign 
manager for a Democratic member of Congress; Randall Shepard was 
Vanderburgh County Republican Vice Chairman in Evansville.100  Yet, 
separation of powers demands judicial restraint—that we not decide 
cases based on political or party preferences.  Given where we came 
from, is that really possible? 
I think you will be pleased with the result.  For the entire time that I 
was on the Indiana Supreme Court, the political balance was 3–2 in favor 
of the Democrats from January 1995 to October 2010 and in favor of the 
Republicans before and after those dates.  Yet, during that entire 
                                                 
99 Frank Sullivan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Roger O. DeBruler, 30 IND. L. REV. 11, 11 (1997).  
By way of example are the following cases: 
[Justice DeBruler’s] dissent in Kerlin v. State, [265 N.E.2d 22, 25–27 (Ind. 
1970) (DeBruler, J., dissenting),] arguing that certain evidence of prior 
offenses was inadmissible, was later adopted by the court in Lannan v. 
State[,] [600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992)]; his dissent in Patterson v. 
State, [324 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. 1975) (DeBruler, J., dissenting),] 
arguing that certain out-of-court statements were inadmissible 
hearsay, was adopted by the court in Modesitt v. State[,] [578 N.E.2d 
649, 652–53 (Ind. 1991)]; and [Justice DeBruler’s] dissent in State ex rel. 
Rondon v. Lake Superior Court, [569 N.E.2d 635, 636 (Ind. 1991) 
(DeBruler, J., dissenting),] arguing for limitations on a petitioner’s right 
to a change of judge in post-conviction relief cases, was adopted by the 
court in State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court[,] [626 
N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind. 1993)]. 
Id. at 11–12. (footnotes omitted).  Many other examples of Justice DeBruler’s dissents that 
were subsequently adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court are also noted and explained.  
Id. at 12; see Kenneth M. Stroud, Justice DeBruler and the Dissenting Opinion, 30 IND. L. REV. 
15, 15 (1997) (noting that Justice DeBruler authored more than 500 dissenting opinions). 
100 Resume of Randall T. Shepard, ST. IND., http://www.ai.org/judiciary/press/docs/ 
pr120711-shepard-resume.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
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nineteen year span, there was not one “Democrat versus Republican” 
case decided on a party-line vote.  Not one.  These cases included 
drawing new district boundaries for the City-County Council of 
Indianapolis,101 determining who won the general election for mayor in 
Terre Haute,102 contentious issues concerning satellite voting sites in 
Lake County during the 2008 general election,103 deciding who would be 
the Secretary of State of Indiana when the incumbent was abdicated 
because of a felony conviction,104 and determining the constitutionality 
of the Voter ID Law.105  Each and every one of these was decided by a 
bipartisan vote. 
It does not violate the confidentiality of the conference room to say 
that these results were not always easy to obtain—although as I think 
about it, they were not as hard to obtain as you might think.  Each of us 
felt a special obligation to try to reach consensus in matters that were 
critically important for the parties before us but also critically important 
for the institutional integrity of our court.  We each recognized that our 
own point of view was not the only point of view and that we could rely 
on each other’s good judgment and goodwill in reaching a solution.  In 
each circumstance, we were able to do so. 
I am very proud to be able to say that.  I hope you will take pride too 
in the fact that by virtue of our merit selection system, the judgment of a 
collection of very good governors, and Hoosier good fortune, your 
Indiana Supreme Court has been able to put party preference aside in the 
acid tests of resolving disputes between the two political parties.  I 
would go further still and say that our performance in the “Democrat 
versus Republican” cases is indicative of the fact that we were able to set 
aside personal political and policy preferences in all our cases.  Of 
course, that is as it should have been, for before us in each such case 
were individuals and entities who had come to us to vindicate their legal 
rights and seek protection for their nearest and dearest interests. 
CONCLUSION 
This has been a long and sprawling talk about some of the lessons I 
have learned about judging during the wonderful almost-nineteen years 
that I had the honor of serving on the Indiana Supreme Court.  The court 
today is in great hands with five extremely intelligent and hard-working 
justices presiding over our state’s judicial system and giving their 
                                                 
101 Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Ind. 2003). 
102 Burke v. Bennett, 907 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ind. 2009). 
103 State ex rel. Curley v. Lake Circuit Court, 899 N.E.2d 1271, 1271 (Ind. 2008). 
104 White v. Ind. Democratic Party, 963 N.E.2d 481, 482–83 (Ind. 2012). 
105 League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ind. 2010). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/5
2013] What I’ve Learned About Judging 215 
considerable talents to deciding the cases before them.  I hope my 
remarks today tell you as much about the challenges of their work as my 
own experiences.  Further, I hope that you will give them that same full 
measure of support and encouragement that you have given me these 
past two decades.   
Thank you for your kind attention. 
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